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I am going to talk to you about institutions and economic development and I am going to be 
concerned with two issues.  One of them is what makes dysfunctional economies or economies that do 
not work well and the second is what can we do about it.  Now that is a neat job to do in an hour.  So I 
will be giving you a very quick and superficial covering of many and very complex subjects. 
I begin with the theory we use to understand the problems.  Neoclassical economics was never 
intended to deal with the issues of economic development.  It evolved in the late nineteenth century 
and its objective was to explain efficient resource allocation in developed economies.  It had two 
gigantic failures as far as our subject matter here is concerned.  One, it was frictionless; two, it was 
timeless, static rather than dynamic in terms of its issues.  I am going to talk first about how to deal 
with frictions; next I shall explore the behavorial assumption that underlies neoclassical theory.  Then 
we can turn to the role of time and then be ready to lay out the problems of development and, in the 
time remaining, see what we can do about them. 
It is fitting that I should be giving this lecture in honour of Gunnar Myrdal.  Institutional 
economics has been around a long time.  In America, we have Thorsten Veblen, John R. Commons 
and a long heritage of institutionalists; and Gunnar Myrdal was a pioneer here in Europe.  The problem 
with institutional economics, and the reason it faded from sight, was that it did not explicitly address 
the issues we had to solve.  What we have to do is understand what makes economies work the way 
they do – that is a necessary precondition to being able to say something about how we can make them 
work better.  Obviously the place to begin is with what institutions are, how they work, and why they 
work the way they do; then we are going to look at some fundamentals that lie underneath the surface.  
Some of you who know the new institutional economics literature will find I am repeating things, at 
least for a while, that you are familiar with.  I hope you forgive me because I want to be sure that 
everybody is (so to speak) up to speed in dealing with the issues that I am going to be concerned with.   
*   *   *   *   * 
Institutions would not exist in a frictionless world where there is no uncertainty.  Institutions exist 
to reduce uncertainty in the world.  In a world without institutions we would not know how to deal 
with each other.  Institutions are the incentive systems that structure human interaction.  They can 
make predictable our dealings with each other every day in all kinds of forms and shapes.  They 
thereby not only reduce uncertainty in the world but allow us to get on with everyday business and 
solve problems effectively.  When we say institutions structure human interactions what we mean is 
that they provide incentives and disincentives for people to behave in certain ways; and if they are 
effective they structure and provide incentives and also structure economic, political and social 
activity.  One cannot make sense out of the world with just economic reasoning.  You have to know 
political and social theory and, as you are going to see, you must also know some cognitive science.  
Now, the reason why of course you need all these is that we do not live only in an economic world, a 
political world or a social world; we live in a world that is a blended mixture of all these.  In the world 
that we are trying to confront with respect to solving problems, we have to develop a body of theory 
that integrates all of them.  That is what institutional theory should be doing.  It should not only 
integrate various disciplines, but, and here I will pay tribute to neoclassical economics, it also wants to 
integrate the analysis with those parts of neoclassical economic theory that are useful and helpful in 
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solving problems – particularly, of course, micro-theory or price theory.  Micro-theory or price theory is 
a perfect complement to a lot of the things that we want to be able to understand and I will be talking 
about it as we go along.   
*   *   *   *   * 
Institutions are made up of formal rules, informal constraints and their enforcement 
characteristics.  Formal rules, of course, are very straightforward.  They are rules put into place; they 
are laws, constitutions, regulations, whatever, that have the character of being specific and being 
defined precisely.  Informal norms of behaviour provide us with more problems because informal 
constraints do not show up in formal terms.  They are ways of doing things and are terribly important.  
The kinds of formal rules that we have in fact occupy a very small proportion of the guides to 
everyday behaviour and actions.  In many ways norms are more important than the formal rules.   
So there are the formal rules and informal norms; and then there are the enforcement 
characteristics of both of those.  This is important.  Some institutionalists have enforcement as part of 
the formal rules and informal norms; indeed, if you do game theoretical models – one of the favourite 
indoor games of a lot of people – you incorporate enforcement within the formal rules.  But that is a 
mistake because you want to be able to ask yourself how effective enforcement is – enforcement not 
only of the formal rules but also of the informal norms of behaviour.   
Let me give you an illustration that shows the role of institutions in their entirety in shaping 
performance, but instead of economic performance I am going to talk about performance in 
professional sports.  The way the game is played is a function of the formal rules that define what the 
players can and cannot do and of informal norms of behaviour that are supposed to prevent you from 
trying to kill the quarterback on the opposing football team or from similar unsportsman-like 
behaviour.  And then there are the referees and umpires, who are supposed to see that people live up to 
both the formal rules and the informal norms.  Now I do not know about here in Europe but I do know 
that in the United States very frequently it pays to play dirty, to try to injure the quarterback on the 
opposing team if he is a good quarterback; or otherwise do in the players on the other side, intimidate 
them and things like that.  It makes a very different game, depending on whether you play the game 
according to the rules and people live up to the standards, formal or informal; or you try to evade them 
and to get away with it.  Societies are like that.  They are structured and made up of a complex of 
formal rules, informal norms and their enforcement characteristics.  It is very important to understand 
something that is obvious but needs emphasis, and that is that enforcement is never perfect.  It never 
pays for it to be perfect because at the margin an incremental resource devoted to enforcement at some 
point is not worthwhile in terms of the increased enforcement obtained.  So you have some trade-off at 
the margin between imperfect enforcement and behaviour.  I do not have to tell you that this is true in 
professional sports; it also is true in everyday life.  We have imperfect enforcement of rules, laws and 
norms all the time, but the degree of imperfection, as you are going to see, plays a big part in some of 
the things that we are going to deal with. 
*   *   *   *   * 
I want now to turn this discussion to neoclassical economics.  Economics is a theory of choice.  
But how do we make choices?  Economists say we use the rationality assumption.  That is saying 
absolutely nothing.  The rationality assumption at its best says that people are consistent and logical 
maybe, but it does not say how people make choices in the face of enormously complex information, 
imperfect knowledge and imperfect feedback on the consequences of their actions.  The physical 
sciences have fundamental underlying structures, and if you understand the fundamental underlying 
structure, you can theorize effectively about problems – in chemistry, those dealing with elements; in 
physics, protons or neutrons.  To solve a new problem, you go back to the fundamental element and 
build on that developed theory to explain problems.  We do not have any fundamental elements in 
economics or in political science or in sociology.  And so we have a very difficult problem: how do 
we, therefore, arrive at understanding what we are doing?  What is the basic building block that we 
have?  Economics assumes that we have perfect information so we know all the alternative choices, 3 
and that given all the alternative choices we make a calculus of benefits and costs and arrive at a 
decision as to what to do.  We do not do any such thing.  What we do is evolve and make choices on 
the face of very incomplete and imperfect information usually with imperfect feedback on the actions 
that have been undertaken.  Understanding how people make choices in the world requires that we say 
something much more fundamental and delve into something much more complicated than what we 
have done so far. 
That takes us into cognitive science.  It takes us into how the mind and the brain work, how they 
interpret the evidence that is before us, evidence that comes in terms of what our senses – sight, 
hearing, smell – receive and from which we build up models of the world.  Now I am going to say 
something that is crucial to my whole argument and is crucial in undermining most of economics.  All 
the building blocks of the world we live in are a product of our human mind.  They do not exist outside 
us.  Such is not the case in physics and chemistry or biology or genetics; there you can go back to 
some fundamental elements by reduction and then build up your analysis.  If I talk about a piece of 
wood, it is there, I can feel it, I can touch it, I can see it.  But again, all the things that we have 
constructed to explain the human condition are things that are constructed in our minds and, therefore, 
do not exist independent of minds.  This means that we must come to grips with something so 
complicated that it requires that we think all over again about the way in which we understand the 
world around us.  Now, I am only going to delve very lightly into consciousness because it is an 
immense subject and one that my friends in the cognitive science field say it may be crazy to raise, it is 
so complicated. 
Consciousness is fundamental to understanding not only why humans are different from animals.  
Consciousness is awareness, is self-awareness about time and space.  It is self-awareness about where 
you fit into a very complex web of things.  Cognitive science has produced thousands of books about 
consciousness, and none of them has ever really explained it.  It is perhaps, next to the origins of the 
universe, the greatest mystery in the universe.  Consciousness is self-awareness and while cognitive 
science has done very complex studies of how biology and chemistry in our brains make us aware, 
they do not tell us how or why the brain works.  Consciousness not only is the source of creativity, 
imagination, of all the wonders of civilization, art, literature, music and all those wonderful things that 
we produce; it also is the source of fanaticism and terrorism and a lot of the things that make the world 
something less than an ideal place.  When we turn around and ask ourselves, as we are going to do in a 
few minutes, what makes societies work the way they do, or not work, we cannot escape being 
concerned about how the human mind in different cultural settings arrives at explaining the world and, 
therefore, making choices.  I am back to the theory of choice. 
Before I turn to time let me concentrate a little on frictions. The economic institutions we have 
that shape directly our world derive from political institutions.  Economists do not like to think that 
they are dependant on political science but they are.  As well as recognizing the formal rules like 
constitutions, laws, rules and regulations, we are interested in who makes the rules and for whom.  So 
a fundamental underlying issue is to see how we have structured the rules of the game with respect to 
whose choices matter, how choices get aggregated, and how in turn that produces the way in which a 
polity makes the rules that in turn shape the economy.  The polity makes and puts in place the 
economic rules of the game.  These essentially concern property rights: not only property rights in 
terms of rules about how property is used, alienated and owned, but also property rights in terms of the 
effectiveness of enforcing contracts and agreements in laws.  What we have, therefore, is a structure 
that humans have evolved – remember it is still all in our heads – a political structure that in turn puts 
in place an economic structure that shapes how that society works.  So much for the frictions part of 
the game. 
*   *   *   *   * 
Now let me talk about time in history.  And let me take you back for a millennium or two; I am an 
economic historian you may remember.  What has happened is that uncertainty about the physical 
environment, which dominated how we structured the game, has lessened over the last five or six 
hundred years as humans have evolved institutions to control the physical environment – not 4 
completely of course, as we still have problems like global warming.  But our world is no longer 
dominated by climate, by uncertainties associated with earthquakes and animals killing us or eating us; 
it is dominated by concern about things that are a product of our creation.  You can see the proof of 
this in the increase over the last few hundred years of life expectancy.  It has more than doubled.  On 
average, people of your great great grandparents’ generation lived to be maybe 40 at most.  Today, the 
average is somewhere between 70 and 80 for women, slightly more than for men.  And you are 
healthier throughout your whole life than they were. 
That is an immense achievement.  Equally importantly, through the development of science and 
its application to solving problems of scarcity, we make possible enormous increases in the control of 
nature such that productivity in agriculture and in all the other dimensions of economic activity has 
just grown astronomically.  So we have changed the world; essentially we have conquered the physical 
environment.  We have made possible a world of plenty.  We have enormous piles of statistics to tell 
us that we have done so.   
But in conquering the physical environment we have created a human environment that is 
immensely complicated and over which we have very imperfect understanding.  And so, on the one 
hand, we have made possible a world of plenty, and a world in which human beings live more than 
twice as long as they did before, and have the possibility of well-being on a level that would be beyond 
the comprehension of our ancestors.  But we have also created a whole new set of problems in a 
human, political, economic and social structure that we are only able to use very imperfectly to solve 
and maintain what we are concerned with. 
What we are concerned with is the cultural heritage of humans.  By that I mean something very 
specific; I mean a set of institutions and beliefs that has been carried forward over the generations that 
constitutes the basic way we perceive the world.  We have a very limited ability to change it; it is path 
dependent in the sense that the inheritance we have of rules, norms, beliefs – those that have survived 
– is deeply embedded.  Sometimes the embeddedness is deeper than at other times but it poses a 
genuine problem because that cultural heritage produces a mix of good and bad that shapes the way in 
which we make choices and the ways in which societies and institutions evolve. 
So what we have to do in the very short time I have here, is to try to talk about the implications of 
this structure for the very rich institutional heritage of political, economic and social rules of the game 
combined with a belief system that has evolved and that together have shaped the way we see the 
world.  We may see the world in terms of developed countries like ours, which means that we see the 
world with one perspective; or from the perspective of a sub-Saharan African country or a Muslim 
country or others.  The cultural heritage and the belief system of each produce results with respect to 
the way in which problems are approached in the world.  Let us turn and look at what that implies. 
Our cultural heritage is a historical function of a twofold phenomenon.  We start with a set of 
beliefs that we have derived from the past, and then we get new experiences that modify that belief 
system over time.  Both the heritage itself and the experiences are shaping the way we understand the 
world around us.  How do we arrive at the set of culturally derived values and norms that we have – 
where do they come from?  Now, if you believe Weber, they come out of religion and they gave rise to 
capitalism.  Weber had it partly right.  What he said was important because at least it got us to escape 
from the economist’s view that beliefs do not matter.  I am going to argue that beliefs are everything in 
the world.  Where they come from and how they evolve is the key really to understanding the human 
condition and how in turn it is evolving over time.  Beliefs generally are derived from the historical 
experiences of human beings in different physical settings.  The economist Jean Philippe Platteau has 
spent a lot of time studying the way in which beliefs systems in Africa evolved.1  Essentially he has a 
view, which is controversial, that redistributive norms that existed in African societies were a function 
of an environment in which there were very few people, vast areas of land and a great deal of 
uncertainty with respect to climate and physical aspects of the environment.  Therefore, the degree to 
which your output was the result of your own effort or the result of good luck was an open question.  
Now in a world like that, according to Platteau, human beings in a family or clan environment would 
feel that much success was good luck and that whether you worked hard or you did not work was not 5 
necessarily consistent with how well you did.  The result was redistributive norms, norms in which the 
lucky people would share their good luck with people who were less fortunate. 
There is a lot of work being done on norms.  A group at the Santa Fe Institute are undertaking a 
set of studies of what kind of background settings have produced different kinds of cultural norms.2  
The norms are important because they underpin the way in which people make choices.  There are a 
number of factors that are shaping how people make choices.  In addition to the cultural heritage and 
the kind of experiences that they have had, there are political systems.  When economics moved into 
politics to create the so-called public choice theory, it carried over the principles of economics and 
applied them to politics.  That carried a certain amount of mileage, but also got economics into trouble.  
The economic rules of the game were put in place by polities; politicians are never disinterested, and 
they are always concerned with certain kinds of objectives.  However, we do not know how to create 
polities that work.  We have a lot of practice in a lot of countries around the world trying to restructure 
polities, but we have very, very limited ability to do so.  We say that economies work well when we 
have a set of market structures in which competition plays the crucial part of forcing the players to 
compete by price and quality rather than compete at other margins like killing each other.  Competition 
plays that crucial role, but we have nothing like it in politics.  We do attempt to confront that issue; 
and, indeed, James Madison, who played a key part in writing the United States Constitution, had a 
system of checks and balances designed to try to structure the political game, so that it worked 
somewhat as the economic game does. 
Let me summarize the foregoing discussion to focus specifically on issues of development.  As 
we evolved over time, the first thing that constrained our abilities to make choices and, therefore, 
shaped what happens to us, was the path dependent patterns in our heritage – the aggregation of beliefs 
and institutions that evolved over time and survived.  The cultural heritage is a mixture of beliefs 
inherited from the past filtered by new experiences including our schooling, family background, and so 
on that modified that belief system.  The experiences are both positive and negative in the sense that 
they are not only experiences that may shape us and make us have a better comprehension of what is 
going on, but also experiences that may make us frustrated and indeed lead to policies producing 
fanaticism and terrorism.  When we ask ourselves, therefore, how we are evolving, we have these 
things happening at the same time: we have path dependence, and we have new experiences that are 
both positive and negative.  We also have lower information costs that are making us much more 
aware about alternatives around the world and, therefore, greatly increasing our ability to see different 
kinds of experience and different success stories.  We have fundamentally increased knowledge about 
the sources of productivity and we have increasing knowledge about what makes polities work. 
When we put those things together, we have forces operating in conflicting ways.  On the one 
hand, bad performance arises from institutions that are inherited from the past and constrain our 
behaviour, or from a polity that does not work well and has in place people with a vested interest in 
perpetuating inefficient rules of the game; and, on the other, are much lower costs of information, and 
a much improved understanding of what makes economies work.  This setting leads us to something 
that Adam Smith understood a long time ago and takes us to some of the key problems that directly are 
involved in the world we live in today. 
*   *   *   *   * 
Adam Smith said that the wealth of nations was a function of the size of the market.  And the size 
of the market was a function of specialization and the division of labour.  Nothing the matter with that; 
it is perfectly true, but what neither Adam Smith saw nor indeed modern economies see are three 
fundamental dilemmas.  The first is the movement from personal to impersonal exchange.  If you are 
going to realize Adam Smith’s world of “size of the market shaping the wealth of nations” you have to 
move from a world of personal exchange to a world of impersonal exchange.  Doing so is not easy.  
Personal exchange means that you have repeat dealings with other people, you know them, you know 
their background; and it pays for you to live up to your word, cooperate, and so on.  A world of 
impersonal exchange is just the reverse; it is a world in which you do not know the other players, in 
which you will never see them again, in which you may have seen them only once, and you have large 6 
numbers of participants.  Now if I put this in a game-theoretic context, it is very simple: a world of 
personal exchange is a world in which it pays to cooperate, because if you do not cooperate the other 
party is going to punish you for it; impersonal exchange is just the reverse: it pays to defect or to take 
the money and run, to not live up to the standards, to not live up to the agreements or contracts.  Of all 
the fundamental transitions that human beings have had to make, the shift from personal to impersonal 
exchange has been one of the most fundamental and is one that is still at the very heart of the failure of 
poor societies to develop.  We can summarize very simply what the issue is; if you are going to move 
to a world of impersonal exchange, you have to change the institutional framework so that it pays to 
cooperate.  That means developing institutions that either through reputation mechanisms or through 
some other devices can see to it that the players will cooperate with each other and that they will 
punish those that do not.  So far so good, that is easy.  But here you get into a really tough problem, 
and that is that as the market gets bigger, reputation mechanisms do not work very well because the 
market gets too big and if you cheat somebody in one market, you can go to another market.  In order 
to have low costs enforcement of contracts in impersonal exchange, you have to have third party 
enforcement.  And third party enforcement ultimately means the polity or the state.  You have to create 
a political system that will put in place rules and laws and enforce them at low cost, that make it 
possible to have successful impersonal exchange on a worldwide basis.  We do not know how to do 
that.  If you have a society which has personal exchange and you try to move to impersonal exchange 
you cannot overnight create a judicial system that puts in place and enforces rules and contracts and so 
on.  You are stuck with something that is very imperfect and usually works very poorly. 
That is one dilemma.  There is another, much less well known; I recommend it to your attention 
because it is becoming a bigger and bigger issue.  When Adam Smith said that productivity growth 
comes from specialization and the division of labour, he did not say it quite right.  What happens in the 
world of specialization and division of labour is specialization of knowledge.  Specialization of labor is 
not just the fact that in a pin factory you get the task done more precisely and then machines replace 
the human hand.  That is trivial; the real gain is that you become highly specialized in terms of 
knowledge.  And that is what we have done.  We have increased enormously the amount of human 
capital investment.  Human capital investment means that we have people specialized in one particular 
thing, and that is all they do if they are not a jack-of-all-trades all of the time.  Your ancestors would 
have lived on a farm, would have built their own house, grown their own food, made their own 
clothing.  We do not do all that anymore, at least not if we want to be a rich society.  Rather, we 
become economists or something more useful perhaps; and we rely on somebody else to provide us 
with food and clothing and housing.  It sounds simple and easy; it is not, because when you get 
specialization of knowledge, how do you integrate that knowledge?  Gunnar Myrdal’s co-winner of 
the Nobel Prize, Friedrich von Hayek, said a price system would do it.  The price system does part of 
it, but it does not do it all.  And indeed what you have is a world in which you must integrate at low 
cost specialized knowledge by building connections.  You have to make those connections, and that 
requires institutions and organizations that deliberately lower the transaction costs of integrating 
knowledge in a society.  Now if you do not believe me, let me try a little experiment. 
As a good economist you know that relative scarcity dictates prices, so if you are a physicist or a 
chemist and you go to Bangladesh, for example, you should command an astronomical price.  In 
reality, if you are a good chemist you do much better staying in the United States, in Switzerland or in 
Germany than you would in Bangladesh.  What is the matter with economics?  Nothing is the matter 
with economics except that it forgot that you are only valuable to the degree that it is possible to 
integrate your knowledge with that of a half a thousand other kinds of people.  In the developed 
countries we have evolved all different kinds of specializations on various dimensions that make this 
possible.  There is a growing area of research in sociology, which is network analysis.  In network 
analysis we are beginning to see the interconnected webs that exist in society in order to realize the 
potential of modern integrated knowledge.  Integrated knowledge is complex and involves people in a 
variety of different disciplines, in a variety of different settings, and in a variety of different 
organizational forms.  In the Silicon Valley in California, almost every kind of skill is available at low 
cost and people meet each other all the time.  But supposing you are a third world country and are 
trying to compete with already developed countries.  You face a big disadvantage.  It is not a level 7 
playing field; it is not easy if you are a third world country to be able to catch up with the first world, 
not because of the simple thing of relative prices, but because you have to bridge knowledge of all 
kinds and integrate them in order for them to be worthwhile and to be valuable.  My second dilemma, 
therefore, is that if you are going to get the advantage of specialization and division of labour, an 
effective price system gets you part way, but beyond that, then you need to develop a variety of 
organizations and institutions that will bridge at low cost, and integrate at low cost, the knowledge you 
need to take advantage of this world of specialization and division of labour.  In straightforward 
economics we do not deal with it very much.  Nor have sociologists working on network analysis 
developed a theory that explains how to put it all together. 
There is finally a third dilemma, equally a Smithian problem.  It concerns efficient markets.  
What do we mean by efficient markets?  There is no such thing as laissez-faire in the world.  Any 
market that works well, whether it is a product market or a factor market, does so because it is 
structured in such a way that the players compete at those margins, and those margins alone, that 
ensure that people pursuing their self-interest also improve the well-being of society.  Almost any 
market that is structured that way is going to have a mixture of property rights and formal rules 
underlying it.  Additionally, it will have constraints that are usually rules and regulations that go 
beyond the very general rules and that specify particular margins of particular kinds of economic 
activity.  That will make it so that the players compete.  The informal norms are important.  When we 
measure transaction costs in different settings, we find that when people live up to contracts and 
agreements, the costs are lower than they are when they do not. 
The conditions differ between factor and product markets, but they also vary over time in the 
same factor and product markets.  So even if a market is working well in time t, it may work well in 
time t+1 only if its structure is modified to take into account changing information costs, changing 
technology, and so on.  In a recent study of telecommunications around the world, the World Bank 
looked at how that market had to be structured over time.  Telecommunications was interesting for the 
obvious reason that at one time it was a natural monopoly and now it is a competitive industry; when 
the technology changed, the whole structure of the market had to change in order for it to work well.  
This is true of almost any market.  You must understand enough about any market so you know how it 
should be structured to make it work the way you want it to.  And you also must understand why it is 
going to change over time.  
*   *   *   *   * 
Now given all those problems, what can we do about them?  Let me be clear: understanding the 
nature of economies and how they work, and the complex interplay between belief systems and their 
cultural heritage and how they interact with institutions is the beginning of being intelligent about 
where we are going.  But given all that, there are still real limitations as to what we can do.  Those of 
you who spend a lot of time in the field are more knowledgeable about that than I am.  But let me raise 
three fundamental issues that are going to pose very difficult problems in being able to improve the 
performance of societies, whether they are our own or other people’s.  First, and very straightforward, 
when you go to a third world country and try to improve performance, there is only one of the three 
elements of institutions that you can alter and that is the formal rules of the game.  But, of course, 
performance is the result of all three: the formal rules, informal norms and their enforcement 
characteristics.  
To illustrate the importance of this issue I will refer you to some history.  When Latin American 
countries became independent in the early nineteenth century, most of them borrowed from the United 
States Constitution because it was a set of formal rules that looked as though they worked quite well.  
They worked all right for the United States; but they certainly did not work well for Latin America.  
The reason is very straightforward; neither their informal norms nor their enforcement characteristics 
were anything like what they were in the United States.  It is not surprising that that is so.  Indeed, in 
general, borrowing rules from another society which has different informal norms and different 
enforcement characteristics is a guarantee of having a rude shock with respect to the consequences and 
implications.  You have to be conscious about the role of changes in formal rules and how they are 8 
complemented, supplemented or influenced by norms of behaviour, which may be different in every 
society, and of different enforcement characteristics.  Neo-classical economists have gone into 
countries and said that all you have to do is get the prices right and everything works.  They have 
fallen flat on their faces over and over again.  The beginning of wisdom is to recognise how 
complicated it is to get what you want.  Now that does not mean you cannot do something about it; 
you can.  What you need, is to know enough about the background and cultural heritage of a society so 
you have some feeling for the interplay between the formal rules and the informal norms and the way 
they work.3  You need also to have a sense of the margins where changes will be effective and what 
the implications of those changes will be for complementary informal norms and enforcement 
characteristics.  You had better be conscious about the interplay among them if you are going to have 
any success. 
The second issue is that ultimately we get to the political system.  Polities are the fundamental 
stumbling blocks to our ability to improve performance because we do not know how to get polities to 
work well.  Barry Weingast4 has begun to make some mileage with what he calls “market induced 
Federalism”, which is the effort to structure polities in such a way that the competition among different 
units in polities approximates competition in economic markets.  There is a growing literature on this 
and we are beginning to be able to do something about evolving polities and structuring them in ways 
that induce politicians to behave in ways that will make them amenable to not lining their pockets.  
Rather, politicians in their own self-interest will do things that make a difference for improving 
economic performance. 
The third issue is a sobering one.  It is not meant to get you all depressed, but it is meant to make 
you very conscious about the limitations of our ability to solve problems in this world.  It is a non-
ergodic world.  An ergodic world would be one in which there was a fundamental underlying structure 
to the system such that all you had to do would be to discover it in order to know how to deal with new 
problems.  We think of the physical sciences as being ergodic in the sense that there is a fundamental 
underlying structure, although lately physicists are having some doubts about this as a result of string 
theory and all kinds of weird and wonderful things that quantum mechanics is getting them into.  Our 
world is clearly a non-ergodic world.  We are creating worlds that never existed before and we are 
creating them without a self-awareness of what the implications are.  To delve further into cognitive 
science than you may want to delve, we say that if a problem is novel, the degree to which we can 
solve it will depend upon the way in which the mind interprets new evidence.  If you have a mind that 
has so evolved that it is quite plastic with respect to perceiving new problems and is accustomed to 
pattern-based reasoning, and if the patterns, therefore, of the new problems are not too different from 
those that your mind is used to, you solve the problem.  But to the degree that we are evolving 
problems that are novel and for which the mind has no basis for understanding them, they are very 
difficult to solve.  It may be that the new problem is a novelty that we do not understand at all and, 
therefore, we resort to superstition and myths or religion to provide an explanation.  But it may also be 
that some of us understand the problem but not the people in the position of making political and 
economic decisions in society.  Now that should be sobering.  We may well know a lot about how to 
make adaptable, efficient institutions; but if the people making political and economic decisions either 
do not understand the nature of the novel problem or think that it would threaten their survival, they 
are not going to change.  Anyway you look at it that is a continuing, never-ending problem of the 
dynamic world in which we live.  We live in an evolving, constantly changing world; we have never 
had societies – political, economic and social – such as those we are evolving.  How well we deal with 
them, how well we confront new problems, how well we can solve them – those are big questions.  
I do not want to depress you, but I also do not want you to think that we are clearly in a world that 
will always get better and better.  The development of science and new knowledge is such that if that 
was all that governed the future well-being of human beings on the face of the earth, we would have a 
rosy future.  There is no sign of diminishing returns to the stock of new knowledge and its application 
to solving problems of human scarcity, none at all.  In fact, if anything, we are still in a stage of 
increasing returns with respect to the development of science and its applications.  But we must 
combine new knowledge with the other two dimensions that shape the human experience.  One is 9 
demography.  That looks as though it is solvable in the sense that fertility and mortality patterns are 
evolving in ways that probably mean we are not going to have the Malthusian worries that we used to 
have.  The other is the institutional structure.  To the degree that problems are evolving, we must 
evolve institutions, political, economic and social, that will solve those problems.  Our best chance of 
doing it is by developing what I have called elsewhere5 adaptive efficiency.  Adaptive efficiency kicks 
in when there are flexible institutions that provide a maximum of choices at a given moment of time.  
In a world of uncertainty in which nobody knows the right answer, you need to try out a lot of things 
and hope you will find one that works.  And you must also have laws and rules, such as bankruptcy 
laws, that eliminate those that do not work.  If you have a society that creates such an institutional 
framework, it obviously has the best chance of being successful with respect to survival and 
continuous performance.  Whether we shall succeed depends on all kinds of complications, many of 
which I have very briefly elaborated upon here.  I hope I have given you something to think about.  
Thank you. 
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